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File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\596FS261
   n2 Preliminarily, the Court notes that defendant Harry
Connick.contends that this Court should decline, under the Younger
branch.of the abstention doctrine, to rule on the constitutionality
of.these statutes, because "virtually all of the plaintiffs in

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\55LD850
   Because a state.court judge was acting in an
administrative.capacity when he demoted and discharged a female
probation officer,.the judge does not have absolute immunity from
a damages suit,.under 42 USCS @ 1983, in which the former probation
officer a

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\378US500
   (2) As to knowledge that the Communist Party is involved in
a.world Communist movement aimed at establishing a
totalitarian.Communist dictatorship in countries throughout the
world, Congress.made specific findings in the Subversive Activities
Control A

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\929F1552
...   Rindley sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
as.damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. @ 1983 for the alleged violation
of.his rights guaranteed under the first, fifth, and
fourteenth.amendments to the Constitution. Specifically, Rindley
sought

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\714FD184
   n2 In their complaint plaintiffs also alleged that
defendants.engaged in a conspiracy to infringe upon their civil
rights in

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\743FD488
 U.S.C..@@ 1983 and 1985 by appellees Judge Hosemann, Judge Dykes,
Buzzy.Dykes, Thomas Weinberg, Kenneth McIntosh, and Alpine Dykes.
.Specifically, she claimed that the appellees, individually, and
as.part of a conspiracy, deprived her of custody of Aaron
   n6 On appeal, the appellants only argue that their rights
to.procedural due process were violated by the appellees
individually.and as part of a conspiracy, and have apparently
abandoned their
   [2-5] The gravamen of Diana's complaint and her basis for
appeal.is that her parental rights were terminated without notice
and a.hearing by means of an official act of a judge, which was
the.product of a corrupt conspiracy between the judge and the ot
   [6, 7] The "color of state law" component of @ 1983 may
be.satisfied by showing that an official act of a defendant judge
was.the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge and
other
   [8] Here, Diana alleges, and the other parties do not
dispute,.that Diana was not given notice or a hearing before the
dependency.adjudication deprived her of custody of Aaron.  She also
alleges.that the dependency adjudication was the product of a cor
   [16,17] However, Weinberg does not adequately address
the.appellants' contention that Weinberg acted as part of a
conspiracy.to deprive the appellants of their constitutional
rights.  To show.a conspiracy to violate @ 1983, the appellants
must show tha
   summary judgment is inappropriate where the record, examined
in......h)..........0*0*0*.........the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion shows any.material facts in dispute.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 90 S. Ct..at 1609. Weinberg's p
   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Judge.Dykes because his actions constituted normal grandfatherly
concern.rather than action under color of state law.  However,
as.previously discussed (see section IIA supra), the requisite
eleme
   [18] The appellants have presented documentary evidence in
the.form of Judge Dykes' notes both before and after the custody
order,.from which inferences can be drawn that Judge Dykes was
the.instigator of the dependency petition and the plan to regain.
   [19-21] As to Buzzy Dykes, the district court concluded that
the.undisputed facts failed to show that Buzzy was a
willful.participant in joint action with the other defendants. n11
To the.contrary, we find  sufficient evidence that Buzzy
participated i
   This section 1983 action arises as the result of a
very.unfortunate dispute between an estranged husband and wife over
the.custody of their child.  If there are any  cases where
conclusory.allegations of conspiracy and wrongdoing
are..................0
   It is easy to sympathize with appellant Diana Dykes'
plight.under the unusual facts of this case.  There is little doubt
that.Buzzy Dykes occupied a favorable position in litigating
against.Diana in the Florida courts, due to Buzzy's father's
position
   It is easy to sympathize with appellant Diana Dykes'
plight.under the unusual facts of this case.  There is little doubt
that.Buzzy Dykes occupied a favorable position in litigating
against.Diana in the Florida courts, due to Buzzy's father's
position
   The grave implication of the Rankin decision is that, based
on.conclusory allegations of conspiracy and prior agreements,
judges
   In short, appellant's bald assertions that Weinberg
was.participating in a conspiracy are met by undisputed facts which
   Appellant's only allegations as to McIntosh's participation
in.the "conspiracy" is that he planned with Buzzy and Judge Dykes
to.use the "illegal and improper" November 22nd custody order,
which.he knew or should have known was illegal.  Amended Compla
   McIntosh was retained by Buzzy and Judge Dykes around the end
of.January, 1978, about two months after the disputed November
22,.1977, order had been entered.  This order was facially valid;
it.had never been appealed or held unlawful.  McIntosh, repre
   It is unclear whether the district judge dismissed McIntosh
for.failure to show state action, for for failure to state a claim.
But it is clear that McIntosh can properly be dismissed for
failure.to state a claim, since the complaint is totally devoid
   As was the situation with McIntosh, there are
sufficient.allegations of cooperation between the Dykes' and the
two state.agents in this case to satisfy the "under color of state
law".requirement pursuant to Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.
Ct..183
   n8 If a prominent doctor, clergyman or industrialist in
Brevard.County had telephoned Judge Hosemann in the same situation,
and an.identical set of events had unfolded, it is doubtful that
appellant.would have gone very far with her conspiracy claim.
   In sum, the possibility that Buzzy Dykes may have occupied
a.favorable litigating position by virtue of his father's position
as.a state court judge is insufficient to sustain a @ 1983
conspiracy
   In sum, the possibility that Buzzy Dykes may have occupied
a.favorable litigating position by virtue of his father's position
as.a state court judge is insufficient to sustain a @ 1983
conspiracy.claim against all parties involved in the original lawsu

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\466US522
   A number of courts challenged the King's Bench for authority
in.those days. Among these were the Council, the Star Chamber,
the.Chancery, the Admiralty, and the ecclesiastical courts.  Ibid
.[***14]   . In an effort to assert the supremacy of the commo
   n13 See also Queen v. Adamson, 1 Q. B. D. 201 (1875)
(mandamus.issued to require justices of the peace to hear
applications for a.summons to answer a charge of conspiracy to do
grievous harm, where
   n15 See, e. g., Floyd and Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng.
Rep..1305 (K. B. 1607) (criminal prosecution for conspiracy);
Taaffe v.

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\561FS325
   My feeling is that they are in a position to be charged
as.principals in a criminal conspiracy to commit theft of public
funds.by fraud committed on the Parish.  The original scheme, of
course,.dates back to 1934, but the conspiracy continues, even up
   On the morning of February 18, 1981, Perez presented the
Motion.to Discharge the Grand Jury, which had been prepared for him
by Mr..Andry, along with the Defley letter to Judge Leon.  Judge
Leon.signed the Order discharging the Special Grand Jury effec
   District Attorney Perez indeed filed these Bills of
Information.charging Elliott and Defley with conspiracy to commit
extortion on
   The Plaintiffs, James Elliott and Joseph E. Defley,
Jr.,.subsequently filed suit on February 16, 1982, against
Defendants,.Leander H. Perez, Jr., Frank Klein, and Eugene E. Leon,
Jr., and.others seeking injuctive relief and damages for the
alleged.viol
   Plaintiff, Joseph E. Defley, Jr., similarly alleges bad
faith.and malicious prosecution on the part of the Defendants in
causing.him to be wrongfully charged with conspiracy to commit
extortion   As to the allegation of bad faith malicious prosecution,
Perez.filed the Bill of Information charging Elliott and Defley
with.conspiracy to commit extortion shortly after the Special Grand
Jury
   With regard to Perez's actions in filing the Bill of
Information......h)..........0*0*0*.........against Elliott and
Defley, charging conspiracy to commit   [*1335]

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\680FD979
   This appeal presents important questions concerning the scope
of.relief available under 42 U.S.C.  @ 1985(3), the extent
of.congressional power to enact a civil remedy for wholly
private.infringement of constitutional rights, and the relationship
betwe
intimidating, or destructive acts against employees at
the.Alligator Bayou Pump Station project.  Nearly two years later,
the.plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding A.A. Cross
Construction.Company, Inc., as plaintiff and the Sabine Area
Building and.C
   No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue.a
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction upon
the.ground that any of the persons participating or interested in
a.labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful comb
   If two or more persons in any State or Territory cnspire or
go.in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the.purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
   (3) one or more of the conspirators must commit some act
in.furtherance of the conspiracy; whereby..   (4) another is either
(a) injured in his person or property or
   The Griffin court, having concluded that the plaintiffs
had.stated a cause of action under section 1985(3), then sought
to.locate a source of congressional power to reach the
private.conspiracy alleged.  The sources identified in Griffin were
the
   Griffin's principles indicate the plaintiffs here have made
out.a cause of action under section 1985(3).  The facts of this
case.clearly embody four of the five elements essential to a
successful.1985(3) claim.  First, the evidence is sufficient to est
unions and individual defendants.  Second, proof that
plaintiffs'.were assaulted, beaten, and threatened and that
property was.destroyed establishes the requisite "act in
furtherance" of the.conspiracy.  Third, these acts are indisputably
illegal apart fr
rty damage, and economic loss.  The only.element requiring analysis
is the requirement that the conspiracy

   In Griffin, the Supreme Court stated that a 1985(3)
conspiracy."must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of
rights secured.by the law to all." 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at
1798, 29 L.Ed.2d.at 348. The plaintiffs in the case at bar contend
that

   Griffin even considered and rejected the very explanation
of.section 1985(3) which was later suggested in the
Novotny.concurrence.  In concluding that the first part of section
1985(3).reached all deprivations of the equal protection of the
law,."whate

   The conspiracy in the case at bar sought to deny completely
the.plaintiff employees' right not to associate.  The district
court.found that several truckloads of men assaulted the plaintiffs
and."threatened to continue violent actons if the nonunion wo
   Plaintiffs are not a class normally afforded special
protection.under the equal protection clause merely because they
wish to work.nonunion.  They are entitled to section 1985(3)
protection only if.they are persons within the second category of
protect
   n10 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (remarks
of.Rep. Blair) (the Klansmen "murder for a difference in
political.opinions"); id.  at 333 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) (the Klan
is a."secret political conspiracy"); id.  at 392 (remarks of Rep.
   Although we find that Congress intended to classify
these......h)!.........0*0*0*.........nonunion employees as
entitled to use section 1985(3) that finding.does not resolve the
question of whether their employer, which is.not a member of the
class, ca
   The district court found that Cross Construction had
been.injured by the attack on its Alligator Bayou worksite.  There
is no.dispute as to the fact of the corporation's injury or that
it.resulted from the defendants' acts in furtherance of the.conspir
   Having determined that section 1985(3) was intended to provide.a
civil remedy for the kind of conspiracy involved here, we
must.respond to defendants' argument that Congress lacks
the.constitutional power to enact legislation of this breadth.
The.plai
......h)%.........0*0*0*.........   The Griffin court concluded
that the Thirteenth Amendment and.the constitutional right to
interstate travel authorized Congress.to reach the private
conspiracy alleged there.  But the court
   The plaintiffs' 1985(3) action cannot be sustained under
the.Thirteenth Amendment, for they are neither a racially
oppressed.group nor suffering in the bonds of involuntary
servitude.  See,.e.g., Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186,
20 L.Ed.2d
l.power. Griffin clearly contemplated that other sources
of.congressional power might be available to justify
other.applications of section 1985(3).Indeed, the original
proponents of.the Ku Klux Klan Act did not base their assertion of
congressional.power
   By these standards, Congress acted within its
constitutional.power when it enacted section 1985(3) to reach the
private.conspiracy involved here.  It cannot be denied that the aim
of......h)).........0*0*0*.........protecting interstate commerce
from u

   any controversy concerning terms and conditions of
employment,.or concerning the association or representation of
persons in.negotiating, fixing, maintaining, charging, or seeking
to arrange.terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or n
   One of the special abuses identified by Congress was the use
of.vicarious liability doctrines under which the misconduct of a
few.individuals could be attributed to the labor organization
that.sponsored a strike or picket line. Courts had applied the c
   Congress recognized that this dragnet conspiracy approach to
    The unions finally urge that the evidence adduced at trial
is.insufficient to support the judgment against them under
any.standard of proof.  After careful reviewing the entire record,
we.agree that the evidence does not warrant the district court's.f
   Wallace had no further contact with the Alligator Bayou
project.until January 17, 1975, when the attack occurred.  On that
day,.Wallace was present at the highway near the access road which
led.to the Cross jobsite on at least two separate occasions.Mo
   Like Wallace, Hill himself gave a more innocent account of
the.episode, and denied saying that he wanted the picture for the
union.bulletin board.His explanation for seeking the photograph
was, "I.don't know.  I guess I am a camera freak.  I like to ha
   In summary, we hold that (1) the anti.injunction provisions
of.the Norris.LaGuardia Act do not deprive the district court
of.jurisdiction to enjoin violence, and (2) Congress intended
42.U.S.C.  @ 1985(3) to provide a remedy for private
conspiracies.di
   Section 1985(3) provides that an injured party "may have
an.action for the recovery of damages" "[i]f two or more persons .
... conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person
or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of e
   If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or
go.in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the.purpose of drpriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, o
   In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790,
29.L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that @ 1985(3)
is.premised on a conspiracy to deny equality and is not a
general.federal tort law. n15 To show that the conspiracy was
designed
   The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection,
or.equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be
some.racial, or perhaps otherwise class.based,
invidiously.discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.
The.conspiracy,
   This is the interpretation of @ 1985(3) that we adopted
in.McClellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir..1977) (en banc).  Turning first to what private action
constitutes.a deprivation of the protection of the laws, we held
that "
   Although @ 1985(3) reaches both public and private
conspiracies.to deny constitutional equality, it is a non sequitur
to conclude.that it, therefore, reaches all constitutional
violations.  The...statute is not designed to   n34 Some courts have held that @ 1985(3) covers violations
of.federal statutory rights.  E.g., Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447
F.Supp..804 (D.Md. 1978) (claims based on @ 3 of the Equal Pay
Act);.Broadcast Employees v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419
F.S
deprivation of."equal protection of the laws."" Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v..Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1979) (violation
of.California's Civil Rights Act) (decided before Novotny );
Accord,.Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971) (zo
   The Supreme Court held in Griffin that the reach of @ 1985(3)
is.limited by the requirement that the conspiracy be directed at
a.denial of equality.  Our colleagues state, however, that in
Griffin."[t]he blacks brought an action under section 1985(3) t
   In Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan As'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366,.372, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2349, 60 L.Ed.2d 957, 963 (1979), the
Supreme.Court held that "[s]ection 1985(3) provides no substantive
rights.itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the ri
   The extension of @ 1985(3) to protect against
private.infringement of every right protected against governmental
action.by the Constitution would create a Bivens. type tort action
against.every private conspiracy that affects a federal
constitutional
   Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976); Collins
v..Bensinger, 374 F.Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill.) (recognizing that @
1985(3).refers only to equal protection and not due process), aff'd
mem.,.506 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1058,
9
   Unlike Griffin, this case does not rest on the adequacy
of.notice of pleading.  The plaintiffs have had their day in court.
.They proved no conspiracy to prevent them from seeking the equal
protection of the laws, or to deny them that protection, or to
class is protected by @ 1985(3).  Slip op. page 15456, page
992.supra.  Not only must the class share some common
characteristic.beyond simply being the victims of a conspiracy, but
it must also
   The majority rejects the view that Cross Construction is
a.member of the protected class. n56 They manage to find a @
1985(3).cause of action in favor of Cross Construction, however, by
holding.that the statute extends a remedy to any person injured by
   n59 Novotny, a male, was a loan officer and member of the
Savings and Loan Association's Board of Directors.  He alleged that
when he "expressed support for the female employees at a meeting
of.the board of directors, his connection with the Associatio
   Although the power of Congress under the commerce clause
is.broad enough to permit it to reach any private conspiracy
designed
   The majority appears to assume that Congress intended
to.authorize a remedy for any conspiracy that might affect
interstate
   The majority holds that the existence of a conspiracy on the
   In my opinion, the phrase "equal privileges and immunities
under.the laws" in the first clause of section 1985(3) refers to
those.rights that the United States Constitution protects against
interference by private action (as well as from impairment by    In my opinion, the phrase "equal privileges and immunities
under.the laws" in the first clause of section 1985(3) refers to
those.rights that the United States Constitution protects
against.interference by private action (as well as from impairment

   "It would be a mistake to read this  legislative intent
as.limited to direct interference with government provision of
equal.protection. . . .  The Ku Klux Klan was a political
conspiracy; its
   "The Court's decision that the acts alleged in Griffin stated
a.section 1985(c) cause of action accords with the original
purpose.of the statute.  The defendants in Griffin assaulted the
plaintiffs.on the highway on the mistaken impression that the dri

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\776FD942
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S. Ct. 122, 83 L. Ed. 2d
64.(1984), affirming the dismissal of a claim against a court
clerk,.we held th that judicial immunity would be assumed despite
the.appellants' assertion that the court clerk and another defe
   n6 Appellants allege no substantive constitutional claims.
As.the panel stressed, "appellants only argue that their rights
to.procedural due process were violated by the appellees
individually.and as a part of a conspiracy, and have apparently
abandone
   n7 The "color of state law" component of section 1983 may
be.satisfied by a showing that a judicial act of the defendant
judge.resulted from a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge may be

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\783FD000
   The panel opinion, which has been reinstated insofar as
it.concerns the other appellants, discusses in only a cursory
and.conclusory fashion the voluminous deposition   [*1001]
testimony.and other materials on which the district judge relied
when he.
   Regarding appellee Weinberg, the panel opinion finds him not
to.have addressed satisfactorily appellants' contention that
Weinberg.acted as part of the alleged conspiracy. The majority
observes that.he could be held liable on such a theory "if he reach
   Later, when a custody order had been entered by Judge
Hosemann.vesting temporary custody in Buzzy, Diana spirited the
child away.to Maryland. The meeting that is said in the panel
opinion to.constitute evidence supporting appellants' allegations
of a.c
   Regarding Judge Dykes, Buzzy's father, the panel observes
that.the judge did some legal research and made some notes on the
law.that might have been helpful to his son in petitioning for
custody.or some other relief. The panel opinion then states that
   [*1002]   Regarding Buzzy Dykes, the panel opinion observes
that.Buzzy went to Weinberg and provided him with the information
upon.which a dependency petition was sought; that he went to the
judge.who had granted him custody of his son when Diana spiri
   Criminal conspiracy has been said to be the "darling of the

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\RESPONSE.DOC
.........17.  The undersigned Plaintiff/Appellant, Robert J.
Chrispen,.would hereby respectfully submit that the subject matter
"Motion To.Strike And Dismiss, Compel, Extend Time And Memorandum
of Law," and.such certificate that there is good ground to su

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\744FS798
   n1 Norton sues only Cobb and not her alleged
co.conspirators..Because civil conspiracy is a tort with joint and
several
   Several federal courts have interpreted Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
727,.86 S. Ct. at 1139-40, as allowing courts, in their discretion,
to.dismiss, sua sponte, pendent state claims under certain factors.
In.Sullivan v. Boettcher & Co., 714 F. Supp. 1132, 1133-3
   In the motion to dismiss both the @@ 1983 and 1985
claims,.Defendant apparently attacks the Complaint as being too
general and.insufficient to allege a conspiracy. n5.
..h)....Footnotes. . . .

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\318FD110
   The Plaintiffs who have perfected their appeal to this Court
as.Appellants are Dr. and Mrs. Richard Nesmith. Filling out the
cast.of characters as Defendants.Appellees are Commissioner of
Public.Affairs Sullivan, Chief of Police Ruppenthal, Desk Captai
   But two things complicate the problem for the trial judge.
The.first is that there are some actions which, although not so as
a.matter of law, might yet be found by the jury to be a violation
of.Civil Rights. The second is that as to these (and also un

   One way of meeting this problem . although certainly not
the.exclusive way .is to apply a "conspiracy" concept. Presumably
that.is what the Plaintiffs did here. In the Plaintiffs' complaint
and.in the pretrial order outlining the issues for the trial t
   For the reasons previously set out, the conspiracy theory
was.not needed as to the initial false arrest and imprisonment;
and, as.to that phase the retrial of the Civil Rights count will in
effect.be limited to damages, compensatory and punitive. As to
   It cannot be questioned that the parties tried the case
below.with full recognition that this is true. The pleadings of
the.Nesmiths abound in charges that the officers were not acting
in.good faith in what they did, but were carrying out a conspiracy

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\699FS64
   Plaintiffs base their claims on 42 U.S.C. @ 1983 and @
1985(3)..They seek a prospective injunction against Defendant
Harding to.prevent his future interference with custody
enforcement.proceedings. They also seek the return of Marc to
Pennsylvania.basi
   Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief against
the.Mormon Church. Plaintiffs' complaint is based upon 42 U.S.C. @
1983.and 1985(3). To maintain a cause of action against the
Morman.Church under either of these sections, plaintiffs must prov
   Plaintiffs' complaint contains numerous conclusory allegations
that a conspiracy motivated by gender based animus existed betweenthe defendants. The complaint, however, is totally lacking in
any.form of factual support for these allegations. Broad and

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\430US651
   In light of this history, it is not surprising to find
that.every decision of this Court considering whether a punishment
is."cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth and
Fourteenth.Amendments has dealt with a criminal punishment.
[*667]

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\USCS1983
   Recovery of additional attorney fees for time spent
establishing.original entitlement to attorney fees under 42 USCS @
1988. 69 ALR.Fed 712.    Action under 42 USCS @ 1985(1) for
conspiracy to defame
   Civil rights action under 42 USCS @ 1983, @ 1985, and @ 1986 was
not barred.by res judicata by Arkansas state court judgment
affirming decision of county.civil service commission sustaining
sheriff's decision to fire plaintiff.employee, where in civil
   Attorney appointed for successful civil rights plaintiff is
awarded $.11,129.50 in attorney's fees plus $ 47.05 in costs under
42 USCS @ 1988 and.interest of 7.2 percent on award from date of
order until paid under 28 USCS @.1961, where attorney's expe
   Section 1988 has been interpreted to provide for recovery of
cost by.prevailing defendant when plaintiff maintains unfounded
action in bad faith,.vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons; reasonableness of plaintiff's.claim must be assessed as
   Attorney fees under 42 USCS @ 1988 will not be awarded to city
and police.chief who successfully defended against excessive
force/failure to.train/conspiracy to deny liquor license claims of
arrested tavern brawlers,.because claims were not frivolous a

   Attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions will be awarded in favor
of landowners.and against developer, where developer filed @ 1983
suit against landowners.after they successfully petitioned to
vacate public roadway providing access to.land developer plan
   Attorney's fees of $ 500.00, payable from bond which have been
posted is to.be awarded to various federal, state, county and city
officials to recompense.them for their legal costs in defending
against action which was filed by.members of Life Science
   Nightclub operators are entitled to double attorney's fees under
42 USCS @.1988, where operators were successful in civil rights
case involving conspiracy

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\694FD489
   After a bench trial, the district court found that the
McMahans.and the Loefflers had committed a tort under the common
law of.Wisconsin by interfering with Kenneth Lloyd's custody of
Carol. .The Loefflers' liability was based on conspiracy.  Aware at
abduction by the McMahans was too small to make them guilty
of.conspiracy.  This argument raises only an evidentiary issue,
which
   It is true, as we observed in a recent case, that conspiracy has
a somewhat anomalous status under tort law, since a tort, tobe.actionable, requires that an injury actually be suffered,
while.conspiracies are no less unlawful for being nipped in the b

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\759FD472
   n2 Plaintiff's alleged that materials published by the State
Bar.indicated a conspiracy by members of the State Bar to cause the

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\818FD411
   n4 The plaintiffs also asserted claims for relief under
42.U.S.C. @@ 1981, 1985(2) and 1985(3) and joined several
pendent.state claims. The district court treated separately the
section.1985 claims, holding that based on the facts alleged in
the.compla

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\395US752
   "Plainly the case before us is essentially different from
Marron.v. United States, 275 U.S. 192. There, officers executing a
valid.search warrant for intoxicating liquors found and arrested
one.Birdsall who in pursuance of a conspiracy was actually eng

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\460US325
   Petitioners point to a number of references throughout
the.debates on the 1871 Act to widespread perjury by Ku Klux
Klan.witnesses in state criminal trials. n16 They urge that,
because.perjury was one of the specific evils with which Congress
was.conce
   n21 Compare id., at 317 (original version introduced by
Rep..Shellabarger) with id., at 477-478 (more general language
in.amended version); see id., at 567, 702 (Senate amendment
adding.language punishing conspiracy for obstructing the due course
of

   n22 It is noteworthy that the imposition of criminal
liability.on persons for conspiracy to give false evidence was not
in.derogation of the common law as it existed in 1871.  Witnesses
were.traditionally subject to a prosecution for perjury committed
   This   [**1118]   evidence does not, however, tend to show
that.Congress intended to abrogate witness immunity in civil
actions.under @ 1, which applied to wrongs committed "under color
of . . ..law." The bill's proponents were exclusively concerned wi
   n7 The action for malicious prosecution grew out of the
related.action for conspiracy.  As early as 1293, various statutes
were.enacted to aid persons who had been falsely and maliciously
indicted or accused of crimes by conspiracy among the defendants

File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\866FD121
   Woodrum and his parents filed an initial complaint in
August.1985  [**5] alleging violations of their civil rights under
42.U.S.C. @ 1985(3) and @ 1983. The complaint also contained pen-dent.state claims including allegations of intentional infliction
  The claims against Jayne Rosson primarily are allegations
of.defamation under state law. A defamation claim was not pleaded
in.the complaint. The district court dismissed with prejudice
all.pendant state claims. The district court dismissed with prejud   To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services
employees under @ 1983, an agreement or meeting of minds to violate
the Woodrums' constitutional rights must be shown. See Fonda
v..Gray, 707 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983). Rosson argued persuasivel

File: C:\COPY\DOCU24.DSK
conspiracy by members of the State Bar to cause the provisions of
the Texas respect to conspiracy." The plaintiffs apparently do not
appeal this part of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress and conspiracy to deprive the dismissed with prejudice the
state law conspiracy claims alleged in the first extent that
Woodrum alleges that Rosson was part of a conspiracy to deprive the
   To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services
employees under @ conspiracy. See Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188
(D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (conspiracy 631 (D. Cal. 1984) (allegations of
conspiracy must be supported by material

File: C:\COPY\DOCUCVRS.DSK
intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to
deprive the dismissed with prejudice the state law conspiracy
claims alleged in the first extent that Woodrum alleges that Rosson
was part of a conspiracy to deprive the    To prove conspiracy
between Rosson and the social services employees under @
conspiracy. See Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982),
aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028
(1985) (conspiracy 631 (D. Cal. 1984) (allegations of conspiracy
must be supported by material conspiracy is a tort with joint and
several liability, Plaintiff may sue one 1983 claim requires state
action and the @ 1985 action requires a conspiracy), a conspiracy.
n5

File: C:\COPY\DOCUPAY
conspiracy was actually engaged in running a saloon.  As an
incident to the




   When is prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit
for damages under 42 USCS @ 1983: post-Imbler cases. 67 ALR Fed
640.

   Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS @ 1983 for
deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial
criminal proceeding. 94 ALR Fed 892.

   Sowle, Qualified immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved
Issues of the Conditions for its Use and the Burden of Persuasion.
55 Tulane L Rev 326, February, 1981.


   The court has often recognized that judges of courts of general
or superior jurisdiction are not subject to liability in a civil
action for judicial acts, even if done in excess of jurisdiction,
so long as such judges have not acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject matter (@ 3[a], infra). Moreover, the
court has clearly settled that the rule as to judges of courts of
general jurisdiction is not subject to a qualification which would
abrogate immunity in instances where a judge acted maliciously or
corruptly (@ 3[b], infra).

   Of further note in regard to the immunity of judges from civil
liability is the Supreme Court's holding that the judicial immunity
principle is fully applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every
person" who, under color of state law, deprives another person of
his civil rights.

[*3]   Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction
[*3a]   immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all
jurisdiction over subject matter

   That judicial officers in general are not subject to civil
liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction was
recognized by the Supreme Court long ago, n2 and such rule, which
is the common-law rule, n3 remains viable as a general statement of
law. Regarding judges of courts of general or superior
jurisdiction, however, the court has subscribed to a broad rule of
judicial immunity, recognizing that such a judge is not subject to
liability in a civil action for his judicial acts, even if they are
in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as he has not acted in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Randall
v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285; Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80
US 335, 20 L Ed 646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed
780, 16 S Ct 631; Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142,
34 S Ct 27; Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S
Ct 1213; Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S
Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795,

 PAGE    5      55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a  98 S Ct 2862.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
   n2 Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618; Randall v
Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285.

   n3 Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct
1213; Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct
984.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
   Thus, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, the
Supreme Court, observing that it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall
be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequence to himself, noted that judges of courts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction. After explaining that such principle obtains in all
countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence,
that it has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for
many centuries, and that it has never been denied in the courts of
the United States, the court emphasized that the immunity granted
to judges is not without limit, there being a distinction between
acts done in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Specifically,
the court pointed out that where there is clearly no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped
authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of
jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible, but
that where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law
in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent
to which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much
questions for his determination as any other questions involved in
the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in
these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend. By way
of illustration, the court stated that if a probate court, invested
only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of
deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public
offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely
wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its
judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the
exercise of the usurped authority, but if, on the other hand, a
judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed within a certain district,
should hold a particular act to be a public offense, which is not
by the law made an offense, and proceed to the arrest and trial of
a party charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its
proper construction, no personal civil liability for such acts
would attach to the judge, although those acts would be in excess
of his jurisdiction. The court said that some of the most difficult
and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon
to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or the mannerin which the jurisdiction shall be exercised, and that the same
principle of exemption from liability which obtains for errors
committed in the ordinary prosecution of a suit, where there is
jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this
kind, and for the same reasons.

   With respect to allegations that an official act of a defendant
judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the bribery
of the judge, private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge
in connection with such conduct are acting under color of law, for
purposes of 42 USCS @ 1983; it is of no consequence in this respect
that the judge himself is immune from damages liability, for (1)
immunity does not change the character of the judge's action or
that of the judge's alleged coconspirators, and (2) the judge's
immunity is dependent upon the challenged conduct being an official
judicial act within the judge's statutory jurisdiction, broadly
construed. National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v Tarkanian (1988,
US) 102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454.

    PAGE    9                               55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *5

   Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome
in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is
not immune for nonjudicial actions, that is, for actions not taken
in judge's judicial capacity; judge will not be deprived of
immunity because action that judge took was in error or in excess
of authority; accordingly, relevant inquiry is into nature and
function of act, not act itself--that is, relevant inquiry is to
look to particular act's relation to general function normally
performed by judge; it is nature of act performed, not identity of
actor who performed it, that informs court's analysis of judicial
immunity.  Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.